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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the problems associated with the conflict between publicity and
a defendant's right to a fair trial "are almost as old as the Republic,"'
innovations in electronic technology have altered the focus of the analysis. The
improved methods and equipment available to deliver a message to mass
audiences have "greatly expand[ed] the sphere of the press."2 Technological
advances allow instantaneous transmission of events with relative ease. The
media has expanded coverage of "high-profile" trials with these capabilities.'

1. The Author is currently a judge on the South Carolina Court of Appeals. He presided over
the Susan Smith trial as a South Carolina circuit court judge. The Author would like to extend
his deepest appreciation to Roxy Beagley, Helen Ann Harper, Amy Mathisen, Patrick McCarthy,
and Sally Wallace for their help in researching this project and for their insight.
1. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976).
2. PATRICK M. GARRY, SCRAMBLING FOR PROTECTION: THE NEW MEDIA AND THE FIRST

44 (1994). As Garry points out by example, "Fiber optic cable, capable of
transmitting electronic, voice, and video messages over the same cable, promises to bring
customized news and information into the home over the telephone." Id. News would "appear
on the home computer, television screen, or video phone." Id. Additionally, "[n]ewspapers may
well evolve into some electronic format in which their contents appear on some form of computer
screen"-as they already do through Internet programs-to be printed by the individual at home.
Id. at 45. Should this evolution take place, the capability for instantaneous update would be only
a computer keystroke away. Garry observes that these technological advances are producing new
kinds of media, including interactive capability. Id. at 45-48. The camera is no exception to this
technologicalrevolution. Cameras are now available which are about the size of a stick of butter.
Conclusions previously drawn about the potential for disruption of courtroom proceedings by the
physical presence of cameras must be re-evaluated in light of current technology.
3. A high-profile trial is one which "captivates public attention in a compelling way,"
commanding the "bright light of intense media scrutiny." TIMOTHY R. MURPHY ET AL., A
AMENDMENT
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Naturally, the influx of people and equipment generated by this attention
creates logistical issues for the judicial system that are not encountered in a
typical case.4 Not surprisingly, the expanded television coverage of trials has
increased debate over the appropriateness of procedural safeguards implemented to protect a defendant's due process right of a fair trial5 because these
same safeguards potentially restrict media access to the court proceeding in
violation of First Amendment protection.'
The introduction of new modes of media communication into the
courtroom also brings new associated costs. The trial judge has sometimes
handled allocating these costs on an ad hoe basis, with minor mechanical costs
of cameras in the courtroom borne by the affected media. However, in at least
one instance, legislative action has been proposed to recoup these administra-

tive costs from the media by charging a fee for electronic access to the
courtroom. 7 Stephen D. Easton extends charging a fee for electronic access
beyond the governmental purpose of recouping administrative costs9 to
redistributing the profits of electronic media to crime victims as subsidized
damages payments. The Easton Model goes another step, proposing that the
trial court auction the exclusive television camera rights in high-profile cases
to the highest bidder. 10 In typical cases not having the audience draw to

MANUAL FOR MANAGING NoToRIUs CAsES XiII

(1992). Examples of high-profile trials include

the Oklahoma City Bombing Trial and cases involving 0. J. Simpson, the Menendez brothers,
Susan Smith, William Kennedy Smith, and Polly Klaas.
4. For example, initial media estimates of the number of satellite trucks which would
converge on Union, South Carolina, to cover the trial of Susan Smith were in excess of one
hundred, according to the presiding judge.
5. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-60 (1966) (noting appropriate limitations,
including restrictions on the number and placement of reporters allowed, that should have been
made by the trial judge); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544-49 (1965) (discussing the negative
impacts of television on trials).
6. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (reversing a
courtroom closure order because the trial judge made no findings that alternative means "would
have met the need to ensure fairness" and failed to recognize the constitutional right of the public
and press to attend the trial).
7. A. 1733, 1st. Sess. (Cal. 1995).
8. Stephen D. Easton, Whose Life Is It Anyway?: A Proposalto Redistribute Some of the
Economic Benefits of Cameras in the Courtroomfrom Broadcastersto Crime Victims, 49 S.C.
L. REv. 1 (1997).
9. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1943) (holding that a government
cannot ordinarily profit by imposing licensing or permit fees on the exercise of a First Amendment right when the licensing tax "is not. . . imposed ... to defray the expenses of policing the
activities in question"); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941) (allowing local
governments flexibility in fixing licensing fees based on applicable administrative costs); see also
Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.
1984) ("Only fees that cover the administrative costs of the permit or license are permissible."
(citing Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050, 1056 (2d. Cir. 1983))).
10. Easton, supra note 8, app. at 52.
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command high bids for the television rights, Easton proposes a fee for daily

access set by the trial judge, presumably governed by the judge's determina11
tion of what the market will bear.
This article discusses the most probable attack which Easton's model
would encounter under a First Amendment analysis. This discussion of the

Easton Model focuses on the governmental fee for access as a selectively
imposed economic burden. Other issues posed by the Easton Model which are
mentioned, but not treated in depth, include intermedia discrimination, equal
protection, and forum-based discrimination.
II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EASTON MODEL

Easton suggests that charging for electronic access to the courtroom is
justified to reallocate large television profits derived from the telecast of highprofile trials because trials are drama, and drama is a form of entertainment-not education. 2 Under Easton's proposal, fees are driven by the
television market. They are not related to the administrative costs of having
cameras in the courtroom. In a high-profile case, the setting of fees is modeled
on an auction process using sealed bids, with exclusive access granted to the
highest bidder.' 3 In a typical case, the trial judge would set television access4
fees, which are charged to all media desiring to televise the proceeding.1
These access fees compensate the victim in the particular trial being televised
if the victim has not otherwise been compensated by the legally responsible
parties.' 5 Any excess funds would be paid into a victim compensation fund
for the benefit of other victims of crime.' 6
Easton argues that his proposal does not offend the Constitution because
the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a right of electronic access to
courtroom proceedings under the free speech or free press clauses of the First
Amendment.' 7 This argument may not pass constitutional scrutiny.'8 Al11. Id.
12. Id. at 20-25.
13. Id. at 52.
14. Id. at 43, 52.
15. Id. at 44-48.
16. Easton, supra note 8, at 45.
17. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965); see also Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S.
560, 573-74 (1981) (noting that allowing television access to courtroom proceedings was not an
inherent violation of due process under the Constitution, thereby opening the door to state
experimentation with television access to court proceedings).
For an excellent discussion of the weaknesses in this argument, see David W. Burcham,
High-ProfileTrials: Can Government Sell the "Right" to Broadcastthe Proceedings?,3 UCLA
ENT. L. REv. 169 (1996).
18. Burchan describes arguments like Easton's as a classic syllogism:
First, the Supreme Court has not recognized a right to broadcast [courtroom]
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though the Court has not recognized a constitutional right of access for the
electronic devices which would permit broadcasting of courtroom proceedings,

this lack of recognition should not be confused with the First Amendment
protection of the press from differential application of economic burdens.' 9
This article discusses the First Amendment concern raised by a proposal to
charge a fee for electronic access to criminal court proceedings-unrelated to
any associated, direct administrative cost-as in the Easton Model. Because
such a model proposes a financial burden singularly applicable to the press,
it constitutes an unconstitutional economic regulation selectively applied to the
press, which impermissibly burdens First Amendment rights.'
Im.SELECTIVE ECONOMIC BURDEN
The evolution of tax discrimination analysis in the area of First Amendment law may be viewed as one part of the Court's struggle to define rights
afforded under the free press clause. Proponents of the organized press as the
"fourth estate" have argued from both a historical and contemporary
standpoint for recognition of independent rights under the free press clause2 '

and for the broadening of the protection of press from governmental
restriction.' Although arguably the Court has never expressly ruled that the
proceedings.. . . Second, the imposition of fees for the right to broadcast
a trial is necessarily less burdensome on the electronic media than complete
denial of access to the feed from the courtroom. It follows, afortiori, that
because the power of courts to deny total access to the electronic feed is not
limited by the Constitution, the power to impose lesser burdens on the
media, such as conditioning access to the feed on the payment of a fee, is
similarly unrestrained.
Burcham, supra note 17, at 180-81, (footnote omitted); cf. Kelli L. Sager & Karen N.
Frederiksen, Televising the JudicialBranch: In Furtheranceof the Public's FirstAmendment
Rights, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1529 (1996) (stating that the allowance of electronic access
may be mandated by "the public's well-established constitutional right of access to the courts and
the prohibition against discriminatory treatment of different members of the media").
19. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2522 (1995)
(to be published at 515 U.S. 819).
20. Id.; see also Burcham, supra note 17, at 180 n.36 (discussing First Amendment
implications of fees for electronic access).
21. See, e.g., Geoffrey Marshall, PressFreedom and FreeSpeech Theory, 1992 PuB. L. 40
(discussing the theoretical foundations of the freedom of speech and the press); John 0.
McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-BasedVision of the FirstAmendment, 63 U. CHi. L.
REV. 49 (1996) (discussing the history of First Amendment jurisprudence); Eric Neisser,
Chargingfor Free Speech: User Fees and Insurancein the Marketplaceof Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J.
257, 261-72 (1985) (discussing the importance of historical and modem financial conditions on
free speech).
22. See, e.g., GARRY, supranote 2, at 149-54 (discussing emerging media technologies and
the need for greater public participation and fewer government restraints); Timothy B. Dyk,
Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 930 (1992)
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free speech clause and the free press clause are distinct,' the Court has
clearly recognized the democratic value of free expression,24 which "prohibits
the state from interfering with the communicative processes through which its
citizens exercise and prepare to exercise their rights of self-government."'
The fee proposed in Easton's article is a monetary exaction on the access
of electronic devices used by members of the media to gather information in
a format suitable for public broadcasting. Under his proposal, the government
assesses a fee for electronic access to a public courtroom in order to subsidize
an unrelated government interest. If the legislation is structured so as to
earmark the money for the sole purpose of compensating crime victims, rather
than as revenue for the general support of the government, it is arguably not
a "tax" as that term is specifically used in the Constitution.2 6 Still, in the
general sense, the Easton fee is an "exaction for the support of the Govern-

ment" because it subsidizes a government interest.27 Regardless of whether
it is labeled a user fee, a license fee, or a tax, it is still an economic burden
charged as a prerequisite to electronic access, controlled in amount by the
government and targeting only the electronic media. As such, it is an
economic regulation directed at the press, which raises First Amendment
concerns.2
Recognizing an access fee as a monetary burden when it is unrelated to
associated costs does -not necessarily render it unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court has continued to affirm the principle that the press can be subjected to
economic regulation consistent with the First Amendment when it is either
generally applicable to all businesses or is justified by a special characteristic
30
of the press. 29 However, beginning with Grosjean v. American Press Co.

(stating that the press should have a greater right of access in order to protect the public from the
government).
23. GARRY, supra note 2, at 107.
24. Id. at 111.
25. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the
self-governmentprinciple is, perhaps, most literally reflected in the concurring opinion of Justice
Brennan in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980), the theme is also
a foundation for the majority opinion in the context of open criminal trials. Id. at 573; see also
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) ("[Slince informed public opinion
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the
publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.").
26. See Rosenbergerv. Rector& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2522 (1995)
(to be published at 515 U.S. 819) (stating mandatory student fees are an exaction on students,
but are not considered a general tax because they do not raise general funds for the university);
see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936) (asserting that taxes "ha[ve] never been
thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another").
27. Butler, 297 U.S. at 61.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
29. Cf. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (stating that newspapers are not completely immune from
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and culminating with Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,3 the Court has definitively ruled that a selective tax-for
example, one which is applicable only to the press-places an impermissible
burden on First Amendment rights unless the government can prove the tax is
necessary to achieve an overriding governmental interest.3 2
The Gros/ean Court struck down a Louisiana license tax levied on the
gross receipts of advertisements carried in newspapers having a circulation of
more than twenty thousand copies per week.33 Discussing Near v. Minnesota,34 the Court observed that "the object of the [First and Fourteenth
Amendment] was to prevent previous restraints on publication; and the [Near]
court was careful not to limit the protection of the right to any particular way
of abridging it.""
Additionally, the Gros/ean Court reviewed the English attempts at
censorship using "taxes on knowledge" and the pre-First Amendment
Massachusetts stamp and advertising taxes, the former being a major cause of
the American Revolution and the latter meeting with such great rebellion that
the taxes were almost immediately repealed.36 The Court found these taxes
to be unequivocal evidence that the drafters of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments intended to preclude the national and state governments "from
adopting any form of previous restraint upon printed publications, or their
circulation, including that which had theretofore been effected by these two
well-known and odious methods." 37 The Court explained that "'[tihe evils to
be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the
government [that] might prevent such free and general discussion of public

matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens. "38
After making these observations, the Grosjean Court found the license tax
imposed on newspapers to be a direct violation of the First Amendment's
freedom of speech and press. Having concluded England's censorship
motivation in the taxes on knowledge to be a foundational impetus for the First
Amendment, the Court described the Louisiana license tax as "suspicious." 39

taxation).
30. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
31. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
32. Id. at 582.
33. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244.

34. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
35. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 249.

36. Id. at 246-48.
37. Id. at 249.
38. Id. at 249-50 (quoting 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LimITATIONS 886 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927)).
39. Id. at 251. The tax was enacted by the Louisiana legislature after Senator Huey Long felt
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This language led to confusion about the application of Grosjean in situations
where no censorship motivation could be discerned.1°
In the subsequent case of Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue,41 the Court held unconstitutional a selective use
tax on ink and paper, which burdened only a small number of newspaper
publishers because it exempted the first $100,000 of revenue." Without
reference to an improper motive of the Minnesota Legislature, the Court stated
that "[illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First
Amendment." 43 The selective use tax exempting newspapers was not
structured in the manner of a traditional use tax as a complement to any sales
tax.' Instead, it was a tax only on the cost of paper and ink products
consumed in the production of a publication, and it applied no matter where
the paper or ink was purchased.4 5
The Court found the use tax violated the limitations of both the First
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause because it selectively taxed the press
and because it differentially treated members of the press.46 The majority
noted that previous cases in which the Court had allowed economic regulation
of the press involved regulations which were generally applicable to all
businesses.47 The Court recognized,
A power to tax differentially, as opposed to a power to tax
generally, gives a government a powerful weapon against the
taxpayer selected. When the State imposes a generally applicable
tax, there is little cause for concern. We need not fear that a
government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its

himself unfairly criticized by the larger newspapers. He circulated to each member of the state
legislature a handout describing the "'lying newspapers'" and the tax as a "'tax on lying.'"
Minneapolis Star &Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,579-80 (1983)
(quoting Brief of Appellees at 9).
40. Cf. Houchinsv. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1978) (suggestingpurposewas irrelevant
in Grosjean); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
383 (1973) (finding no censorship motive and noting the holding of Grosjean); United States v.

O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968) (finding the legislative purpose was irrelevant because the
inevitable effect was an abridgement of constitutional rights).
41. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
42. Id. at 591.
43. Id. at 592.
44. Normally, a use tax is a charge on out-of-state sales equivalent to the sales tax on in-state
sales, the purpose of which is to treat uniformly the transactions and thereby curtail out-of-state
purchasing designed to avoid sales tax. See id. at 577.
45. Id. at 582.
46. Id. at 591.
47. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 583.
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constituency. 48
In what the majority described as a pure First Amendment analysis, the Court
concluded: "Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on
the interests protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance
such treatment unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compel-

ling importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation." 49
Although revenue raising was the main interest asserted by Minnesota as
justification for its statute, the Court found this reasoning to be insufficient to
sustain the tax because the state clearly had alternative means of furthering its
purpose (for example, general taxation) without raising concerns under the
50
First Amendment.
In addition to singling out the press as a whole, the special use tax also
violated the First Amendment because it targeted a subset of the press, a small
group of newspapers. 5 The $100,000 exemption essentially limited the
application of the tax to only eleven publishers in 1974 and thirteen publishers
in 1975, with Minneapolis Star ("Star Tribune") paying roughly two-thirds of
the revenue raised by the tax. 2 This effect was discrimination within the
same medium, which was impermissible for essentially the same reasons as
selective taxation of the press in general. 3 The Court also observed that
allowing a state to tailor a tax so that it burdens only a few members of the
press "presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by
Minnesota can justify the scheme. "I
Following Minneapolis Star, the Court in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland'5 concluded, under a strict scrutiny analysis, that a facially
general sales tax was unconstitutional when its exemptions were based on the
content of magazines. 6 Even though the sales tax had general application,
Arkansas exempted newspapers57 and "'religious, professional, trade and
48. Id. at 585.
49. Id. Moreover, "the very selection of the press for special treatment threatens the press
not only with the current differential treatment, but also with the possibility of subsequent
differentially more burdensome treatment." Id. at 588.
50. Id. at 586.
51. Id. at 591.
52. Id. at 578-79.
53. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 592-93.
54. Id. at 592.
55. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
56. Although in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. the majority concluded that a pure First
Amendment analysis was properrather than an equal protection analysis, the majority in Arkansas
Writers'Project,Inc. did not distinguish as clearly. The Court recognized that "First Amendment
claims are obviously intertwined with interests arising under the Equal Protection Clause.
However, since Arkansas' sales tax system directly implicates freedom of the press, we analyze
it primarily in First Amendment terms." Id. at 227 n.3 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 224 (citing ARK STAT. ANN. § 84-1904(t),O) (Michie 1980) (recodified as ARK.
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sports journals and/or publications... when sold through regular subscriptions.'"58
The Court concluded that the application of the sales tax in Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. was content-based, and thus required strict scrutiny
analysis,5 9 because it distinguished between publications based on subject
matter." The tax discriminated among different types of magazines,6"
similar to the discriminatory effect of the $100,000 exemption in Minneapolis
Star. As in Minneapolis Star, the state countered that raising revenue was an
interest important enough to sustain differential taxation. Noting that the
MinneapolisStar Court had determined that this interest alone could not justify
different treatment among members of the press, the Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. Court held the same was true of a tax which differentiates
between magazines.' Although Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. raised the
issue of differential treatment between newspapers and magazines, the Court
found it unnecessary to address this issue.63
The Easton proposal suffers from the same constitutional infirmity as the
unconstitutional use tax on ink and paper in Minneapolis Star. It is a monetary
exaction by the government which selectively places an economic burden on
the press, and more specifically, one segment of the press. The government
may argue that no First Amendment rights are implicated when a television
reporter has the same right of access to observe courtroom proceedings as
other members of the public. However, this argument disregards the
underlying potential for censorship inherent in a scheme which places a
selective economic burden on this press activity.
The seminal case cited for the proposition that there is no constitutional
=
right of television camera access to criminal proceedings is Estes v. Texas
The Estes Court considered the impact of television in the context of the
defendant's right to a fair trial, concluding that the extensive impact in that
case violated due process.6 As Justice Harlan opined in what later proved to
be a pivotal concurring opinion,6 "The rights to print and speak, over

CODE ANN. § 26-52-401(4) (Michie 1992))).
58. Id. (quoting § 84-1904(j) (recodified as § 26-52-401(14) (Michie 1992) (amended in 1993
to read: "sales of publications sold through regular subscription, regardless of the type or content
of the publication. ....
" (Michie Supp. 1995)))).
59. Id. at 231.
60. Id. at 229-30. But see supra note 58 (1993 amendment of quoted code section).
61. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc., 481 U.S. at 229.
62. Id. at 231-32.
63. Id. at 233.
64. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
65. Id. at 541-44, 550-52.
66. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1981) (interpreting Justice
Harlan's opinion as specifically addressing the facts of the case and not announcing a per se ban
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television as elsewhere, do not embody an independent right to bring the
mechanical facilities of the broadcasting and printing industries into the
courtroom." 6 7

Each of the justices writing opinions in Estes grappled in his own way
with the constitutional implications of the effects of televising criminal trials
in the context of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. However,
none of the justices attempted to articulate a bright line or clear method for
distinguishing permissible governmental regulation of the electronic access
from impermissible regulation of press in the First Amendment context. The
subsequent case of Chandler v. Florida6' again evaluated the effects of
television on the trial process, concluding that Estes did not construe the
televising of criminal trials to be an inherent violation of due process.69
Any interpretation of these cases concluding that the regulation of
television cameras employed in the news-gathering function has no First
Amendment implications is overly broad. In other settings, the Supreme Court
has clearly included the television media as speakers entitled to the protection
of the First Amendment. ° Although restrictions on the placement of "the
mechanical facilities of the broadcasting . . . industries" in a criminal trial
proceeding may not infringe on a constitutional right,7 1 they do have First

of televising trials on the grounds of an inherent denial of due process).
67. Estes, 381 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
68. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
69. Id. at 570-74.
70. Though cable operators do not actually originate most of the programming
they show, the Court correctly holds that they are, for First Amendment
purposes, speakers. Selecting which speech to retransmit is, as we know
from the example of publishing houses, movie theaters, bookstores and
Reader's Digest, no less communication than is creating the speech in the
first place.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 674 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 636 ("There can be no disagreement on an initial
premise: Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are
entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment."); Leathers
v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) ("Cable television provides to its subscribers news,
information, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' under the First Amendment, and is, in
much of its operation, part of the 'press.'"). If cable operators and programmers are speakers,
then certainly other forms of electronic communication, including broadcasters, are speakers
protected by the First Amendment.
71. Estes, 381 U.S. at 589. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)
is also illustrative. There, copies of tapes containing presidential conversations were introduced
into evidence in the criminal prosecution of White House officials for obstruction ofjustice. Id.
at 591-92. Twenty-two hours of tape were played to the jury and members of the public in the
courtroom, including the media; and transcripts, which were not introduced as evidence, were
nonetheless made available and widely copied and published by the press. Id. at 594. At the end
of the trial, the media requested access to the published portion of the tapes in order to copy them
for further broadcast. Id. Because several defendants appealed their convictions, the trial judge
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Amendment implications. 72 This conclusion stems from the fact that restrictions adversely impact the electronic media's ability to gather information in
a format capable of being broadcast, just as a tax on ink and paper indirectly
impacts a newspaper's ability to publish. 3 Consequently, a charge for
electronic access to the courtroom, in addition to being selective, indirectly
burdens the First Amendment rights of the press.
The tax in Minneapolis Star was unconstitutional because it had the
potential of placing an indirect financial burden on a few newspapers by
increasing their cost of publication.74 The Court recognized that a tax of
general application impacts a government's constituency, which greatly

reduces the risk of an improper motive.75 Conversely, the Court observed:
When the State singles out the press, though, the political constraints that

prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of general applicability
are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute. That
threat can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical comment by
the press, undercutting the basic assumption of our political system that the

denied access, finding that the widespread broadcast of actual tapes to mass audiences, with
attendant editing and commentary, could jeopardize the defendants' rights upon retrial if their
appeals were successful. Id. at 595.
Although the appeals were concluded by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the
Court agreed that a common-law right of access to judicial records exists; however, it also
affirmed the notion that the trial judge has discretion to deny access if necessary to satisfy the
demands of due process. Id. at 598. In addition, the Court determined that making a judicial due
process determination was unnecessary because Congress had established an administrative
process to take custody of presidential tapes and materials, evaluate the parties' competing
interests, and disseminate recordings found to be proper for public scrutiny. Id. at 603.
The Court also rejected Warner Communications's argument that the denial of access to the
tapes was violative of the First Amendment simply because the denial prohibited the media from
determining the inflection and emphasis of the voices. Id. at 610. Citing Estes v. Texas for the
proposition that "a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member
of the public," the Court concluded no truncated flow of information existed because those
members of the public present in the courtroom, including the press, were allowed to listen to
the tapes during the trial and were provided with transcripts. Id. at 609. Consequently, the Court
implicitly declined to recognize a qualitative difference in the information.
72. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972) ("[N]ews gathering is not
).
without its First Amendment protections ....
73. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
74. Justice Rehnquist dissented, concluding that the tax was actually less burdensome than
a sales tax of general application on the final product. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 597-98 (1983). However, the majority found this
argument to be short-sighted, observing that differential taxation allowed for possible censorial
effects-evenif the current tax scheme was more favorable-becauseof the threat of future, more
burdensome treatment. Id. at 587-89 & nn. 10-11.
75. Id. at 585 ("We need not fear that a government will destroy a selected group of
taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its
constituency.").
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press will often serve as an important restraint on government. 76
The Court concluded that differential treatment, not "justified by some
special characteristic of the press," suggests that the goal of the regulation is
not unrelated to suppression of expression, and therefore it is presumptively
unconstitutional.' Furthermore, the Court found that the inherent danger of
censorship in differential taxation of the press violates the First Amendment
unless the State justifies the means as necessary with a counterbalancing
interest of compelling importance.78 Just as the State's important interest in
raising revenue could clearly be achieved without differential taxation in
Minneapolis Star,7 9 the compelling interest of compensating crime victims,

which is the purpose of Easton's proposal, is similarly capable of being
achieved without differentially burdening the electronic press.
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York Crime Victims
Board,'" the Court struck down a crime victim compensation scheme enacted
by the state legislature in response to the celebrated Son of Sam serial killer
case. 8' The New York Legislature had attempted to ensure that monies
received by criminals for selling their stories would be available to compensate
the crime victims.82 To effectuate this purpose, the statute required "any
entity contracting with an accused or convicted person for a depiction of the
crime to submit a copy of the contract to [the] New York State Crime Victims
Board... and to turn over any income under the contract to the Board.""
The Court found that the State possessed "a compelling interest in ensuring
that victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them,"' but less
restrictive means are available.' Additionally, the statute in question
supplemented "pre-existing statutory schemes authorizing the Board to
compensate crime victims for their losses." 86 "The Board [could not] explain
why the State should have any greater interest in compensating victims [of
crime] from the proceeds of such 'storytelling' than from any of the criminal's
8 the interest of the State had
other assets."' As in Minneapolis Star,"

76. Id. at 585.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 586-87.
80. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
81. Id. at 123.
82. Id. at 108.
83. Id. at 109.
84. Id.at 118.
85. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
86. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 111.
87. Id.at 119.
88. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592
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nothing to do with its regulatory classification. 9
Similarly, the Easton Model fails to connect the governmental interest in
compensating crime victims with the fee imposition on camera access because
"[e]very State has a body of tort law serving exactly this interest."' More

importantly, increasing general taxation can be employed for this pur-

poseP t-differential taxation of the press is unnecessary. Consequently, the
Easton proposal cannot survive analysis under the First Amendment principles
recognized in Minneapolis Star.
IV. INTERMEDIA DIscRIMINATION

If Easton's proposal is not an impermissible, selective economic burden
on the press under Minneapolis Star, constitutional analysis becomes more
problematic. The subsequent decision of Leathers v. Medlock 2 is generally
recognized as a significant retreat from the sweeping principles developed in
Minneapolis Star.' The Arkansas general sales tax was again at issue. 4 The
tax specifically exempts subscription and over-the-counter newspaper sales and
subscription magazine sales,' but includes cable television as an industry
subject to the tax. 6 After suit was filed alleging intermedia discriminatory
treatment and intramedia discrimination because satellite broadcast television
was not taxed, Arkansas amended the sales tax statute to cover satellite
broadcast television services.'
Rejecting the contention that the tax was discriminatory, the Court
articulated three situations in which a tax which discriminates among speakers
is suspect under First Amendment scrutiny: (1) if it "single[s] out the press for
special treatment," as in Minneapolis Star;98 (2) if "it threatens to suppress
the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints," as in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. ;" and (3) if "it targets [such] a small group of speakers" that it
resembles a penalty for particular speakers or particular ideas, as in Grosjean

(1983); see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987) (holding
the state failed to show a compelling justification for a content-based, selective taxation of
magazines).
89. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 117.
90. Id. at 118.
91. See MinneapolisStar, 460 U.S. at 586.
92. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 41-54.
94. Medlock, 499 U.S. at 442.
95. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-52-401(4), (14) (Michie 1992).
96. Medlock, 499 U.S. at 442 (citing § 26-52-301(3)).
97. Id. at 442-43 (discussing the content of § 26-52-301(3)(D)(i)).
98. Id. at 445.
99. Id. at 447.
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and Minneapolis Star."° Finding none of those circumstances present, the
Court upheld the tax, remanding to the Arkansas Supreme Court to determine
whether the interim, differential treatment of cable television and satellite
television violated equal protection principles. 1 01

The Medlock Court is seemingly more deferential to state taxing authority,
reflecting the views expressed in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in
Minneapolis Star."° The Court observed that "[i]nherent in the power to tax
is the power to discriminate in taxation. "103
In the wake of Medlock, the Easton proposal would probably withstand
a challenge based on intermedia discrimination. Unless the description of
television coverage of high-profile trials as entertainment is viewed as an
underlying censorship motivation, the proposal is clearly content-neutral.
Because the fee in most cases would be charged to all electronic media seeking
access to a normal trial, that part of the Easton Model does not impermissibly
target a specific group of speakers. Consequently, Easton's proposal would
probably withstand this constitutional analysis.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The Equal Protection Clause does not guarantee a fundamental right; it
prevents differential treatment by the government of those attempting to
exercise the right. 4 As the Court observed in Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc., First Amendment claims can be intertwined with equal protection
considerations." In that case the Court held "that the State's selective

application of its sales tax to magazines is unconstitutional."" ° The content-

100. Id. at 447-48.
101. Id. at 453.
102. Justice Rehnquist analyzed the use tax in Minneapolis Star from an equal protection
standpoint, arguing strict scrutiny is only required when the classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 600 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that courts were not capable of evaluating the relative burdens of differing
methods of taxation. Id. at 600-01. According to his calculations, the use tax actually benefited
the newspapers, thus no fundamental right was infringed. Id. at 603. Therefore, neither strict nor
intermediate level scrutiny was required: Rather, the state need only establish a rational basis for
the classification. See id. at 602. Rehnquist noted that the Court had in the past shown the
greatest deference to state legislatures regarding the drafting of their tax schemes. Id. at 599.
103. Medlock, 499 U.S. at 451.
104. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982) (discussing right-to-travel
cases with "distinctions between newcomers and longer term residents").
105. 481 U.S. at 227 n.3; see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972) ("Of course, the equal protection claim in this case is closely intertwined with First
Amendment interests. ").
106. Arkansas Writers' Project,Inc., 481 U.S. at 233.
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based regulation required the State to show that the regulation was narrowly

drawn to achieve a compelling state interest."0 7
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC the Court observed "laws

that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special treatment,
'pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,' and so are always subject to
at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny."108 Because
the Court has rejected the argument that electronic access to criminal
proceedings is constitutionally protected, denial of that access would not, by
itself, raise a colorable First Amendment challenge. "° However, the Easton
proposal does single out particular members of the press for special treatment,
which raises an equal protection challenge because it "poses a particular
danger of abuse by the State.'10
Although Easton's categorization of televised trials as entertainment may
have appeal to the public and a legislative body considering his concept, it is
not advanced as a necessary legal premise for his proposal. If it were, it would
almost certainly raise an additional First Amendment concern as being a
content-based distinction."' Any governmental attempt to restrict speech

107. 481 U.S. at 231; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41
(1994) (adopting implicitly the tiered equal protection analysis employed in Arkansas Writers'
Project,Inc., 481 U.S. at 231 (content-based/strictscrutiny) and in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (content-neutral/intermediatescrutiny)). But cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (condemning the use of the equal protection strict scrutiny test by the majority as
unnecessary and incorrect in the analysis of a content-based restriction).
108. 512 U.S. at 640-41 (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc., 481 U.S. at 228)
(alteration in original).
109. Supra text accompanying notes 70-72.

110. Arkansas Writers' Project,Inc., 481 U.S. at 228.
111. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) ("As a general
rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of
the ideas or views expressed are content-based."); cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197
(1992) ("Whether individuals may exercise their free speech rights near polling places depends
entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign."); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 318-19 (1988) (plurality opinion) ("Whether [the municipal ordinance permits] individuals
[to] picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether their picket signs are
critical of the foreign government or not.").
TurnerBroadcastingillustrates the difficulty in drawing the line between content-based and
content-neutral regulation of speech. There, cable operators and programmers contested the
constitutionality of sections four and five of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 which, inter alia, required that they set aside cable channels to carry
broadcast televisiontransmissions ("must-carry provisions"). TurnerBroad.Sys., Inc., 512 U.S.
at 630-32. The Court concluded Congress's justifications for these provisions-ostensibly to
protect "'public affairs programming and other local broadcast services critical to an informed

electorate'"-did not reflect a content-based purpose for the regulation. Id. at 648 (quoting Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(1 1),
106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (1992)). Despite the congressional acknowledgement that local and
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based upon content would require the application of the strictest scrutiny,
which places the burden on the government to prove the restriction is narrowly

tailored to a compelling state interest." 2
The Easton Model clearly raises a colorable First Amendment claim.
Freedom of press and speech imply that access must be afforded to the public.
Any regulation or denial of that access is subject to scrutiny by the courts, and
the Supreme Court has adopted a three-tiered analysis of constitutionally
suspect restrictions on individual liberties."I
The Easton proposal could not survive intermediate scrutiny. This
standard is met "'"so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation."'""' As treated previously, the governmental purpose of

compensating crime victims is compelling, however no nexus exists between
this interest and an electronic access or no access regulation." 5 Because no
basis exists for the assertion that the governmental interest here (the compensation of crime victims) can be achieved less effectively absent the Easton
regulation (a charge for electronic access
to criminal proceedings), the
'
classification is patently underinclusive." 6
VI. FORUM ANALYSIS
Government can act in a proprietary manner when it is properly engaged
in a commercial enterprise.117 Forum analysis allows "balancing, based on
noncommercial stations aid in educating the public, "Congress [does not necessarily] regard[]
broadcast program as more valuable than cable programming. Rather, it reflects nothing more
than the recognition that the services provided by broadcast television have some intrinsic value
and, thus, are worth preserving against the threats posed by cable." Id. (emphasis added). The
dissent disagreed, concluding the must-carry provisions were a result of a preference for
broadcasters and were justified by Congress on explicit findings which were content-based. Id.
at 675-76.
112. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
113. Under the three-tiered scrutiny approach, a governmental restriction which is contentbased requires strict scrutiny analysis: The government must demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest which cannot be achieved in a less restrictive manner. Regulations which
pose a colorable First Amendment challenge without regard to the content of the conduct or
speech being regulated are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, requiring that the
government show the regulation is narrowly tailored to an important or substantial governmental
interest. Finally, regulations which do not implicate the First Amendment are subject only to the
rational basis analysis, permitting governmental regulation if rationally related to a governmental
interest.
114. Id. at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791, 799 (1989) (quoting
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985))).
115. Supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
116. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 123 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the Son of Sam law was underinclusive).
117. See Burcham, supra note 17, at 208-09 (discussing Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.
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the nature of the forum, the governmental interest in enforcing the restrictions
against the inhibitions the restrictions impose on the speech-related activity."11 The concept of allowing the government to act in a proprietary
manner to sell electronic access to criminal trials by charging a fee unrelated
to the direct administrative costs is antithetical to the "common core purpose
of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government."119
The genesis for Easton's concept is the assumption that commercial
television programmers advertise, format, and broadcast criminal trials as
entertainment."n Logically, the Easton proposal has the potential for
cultivating this premise (assuming this generalization is accepted as true) by
favoring those stations which have the largest profit margins. Such favor is
antagonistic to the core governmental purpose articulated in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc.1' and to the underlying reason which motivated state
courts to adopt rules allowing cameras in the first place-for educational

purposes. 12
The concept of government acting in a proprietorship role to sell
electronic access to criminal trials for profit, either by auction or fee, presents
a further danger of constitutional dimension. It places the State's compelling
interest of compensating crime victims in direct conflict with its fundamental
responsibility to assure the defendant a fair trial.
David W. Burcham argues persuasively in his article High-ProfileTrials:
Can Government Sell the "Right" to Broadcast the Proceedings?'1 that
forum analysis is a more suitable format for consideration of these con-

cepts.

4

He recommends forum analysis because it "focuses the constitu-

tional inquiry on the nature of the governmental property involved and the
government's conduct in managing that property, the type of burdens
government seeks to impose, the interests underlying those burdens, and the
First Amendment values at stake." 125

v. MetropolitanTransp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984)).
118. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. MetropolitanTransp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 775
(2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471, 473-74 (2d Cir.

1980)).
119. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
120. Easton, supra note 8,at 20-25.
121. 448 U.S. at 573.
122. See, e.g., In re Extensionof Media Coverage, 472 A.2d 1232, 1234 (R.I. 1984) ("[Ihe
reason for allowing broadcasting and photographing of trial procedures is the potential
contribution that the media can make in the area of wider public understanding ...of judicial
proceedings. .. ").
123. Burcham, supra note 17.
124. Id. at 198-206.
125. Id. at 217.
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Under forum analysis, public property is divided into three different
categories, each of which is governed by different First Amendment standards:
(1) property which has historically been dedicated to the public and used for
assembly and expression; (2) property which has not been so dedicated, but
is opened by the government for such expressive activity; and (3) property
which has not been traditionally designated as a forum for public communication.' 26 Burcham argues that when government proposes a "fees-for-feed"
program, it should not be viewed as regulating the broadcast of courtroom
proceedings, but as leveraging its control over certain governmental property
to generate revenue.127
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the government may constitutionally deny access to the
electronic methods by which the media collect news for broadcasting when
those methods may interfere with the right of a defendant to a fair trial, this
ability does not mean that government is free to discriminate in its grant of
electronic access. Thus far, the Court has rejected recognition of a qualitative
distinction between electronic methods of news-gathering from more traditional
news-gathering. However; the Court has recognized that electronic broadcasters and programmers are speakers engaged in First Amendment activity. When
the government singles out the electronic media to pay a fee based on the
commercial value of the courtroom proceedings as a prerequisite to electronic
access, the government places selective economic conditions on an element of
the press which indirectly burdens First Amendment activities. When the fee
is charged to produce revenue for a purpose only tangentially related, rather
than to recoup direct administrative costs associated with the electronic access,
it is an unconstitutional tax.
Even if the access fee or bid process is not considered to be taxation
because it is voluntarily paid for access transcending the right of the general
public, it is still a law selectively applicable to an element of the press.
Because it has no nexus to the compelling governmental purpose of compensating crime victims, no evidence demonstrates that compensating crime victims
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Consequently, the
proposal violates the Equal Protection Clause.

126. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. MetropolitanTransp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767,77273 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983)).
127. Burcham, supra note 17, at 217-18.
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